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The tragic events in Madrid in March this year have initiated a discussion about the 
poor state of the European counter-terrorism co-operation. Alongside this discussion, 
an idea to create a European Intelligence Agency has arisen. Being submitted this 
time by the Belgium Prime Minster, this scheme is the most extreme panacea for the 
insufficient co-operation and exchange of intelligence in the EU. However, it seems 
that to ascribe this issue only to counter-terrorism prevention is misleading and is 
also making it difficult to define matters of the European intelligence co-operation in 
its right place and context, namely as an indispensable mechanism for creating and 
conducting Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).  
 
Not only against terrorists 
 
The anti-terrorist co-operation and prevention in Europe is being critically assessed. 
The imperfect flow of intelligence to Europol, highlighted in the Declaration of the 
European Council on 25 March 2004, as well as the lack of co-operation between 
agencies, is the result of omnipresent difficulties in the co-operation among 
intelligence services. Even national intelligence, security services and police forces 
are part of this phenomenon. Moreover, the issue of the insufficient exchange of 
intelligence confirms a well-know fact that foreign, defence and security policy is one 
of the weakest points among integration policies.  
 
Is then the idea to create European intelligence unreal? Do politicians, by criticising 
or supporting this idea, simplify on purpose or unconsciously this issue by putting it 
into a form of ‘for’ or ‘against’ a European Intelligence Agency (EIA) or a “European 
CIA” as it is referred to by media? For it is important to differentiate mechanisms of 
the intelligence co-operation, the co-operation or even the integration, in particular in 
the field of analyses and evaluations, from a creation of a formal European structure 
engaged in its own intelligence tasks, especially operational ones. One should not 
undergo the pressure of the present moment as well as the pressure of the current 
events and reduce the whole issue only to a co-ordination in the fight against 
terrorism and the exchange of intelligence on this subject. This is only one of the 
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undoubtedly important aspects of much wider area, namely that of the European 
integration in the field of foreign and defence policy or at least the co-ordination of the 
European politics in this field. This has proved to be very difficult, in particular since 
the Iraqi crisis.  
  
What is then essential to develop a common foreign and defence policy of the 
European Union on the assumption that this should be a natural process to be 
crowned with the standardization of national interests of individual Member States in 
this area? What is necessary is the feeling of community of interests and threats. 
This feeling is still, according to various analyses, non-existent in the majority of the 
European capitals. Therefore a key to this problem could lie within a different 
approach to the scale and the nature of threats in individual states. It could also lie in 
different views formed on the basis of varied evaluations and information. Bjorn 
Muller-Wille, who conducts researches in this field, accurately pointed out that 
‘exchanging knowledge is a first step to negotiate views, to form and implement 
common policies and to make use of possible synergies in the fight against threats’1. 
Similar expressions can be found in the European Security Strategy, developed by 
the EU High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana: ‘ common assessment of 
threats is the basis for common actions and this requires improvement in the 
exchange of intelligence information among Members States and partners’2. 
Moreover, the emphasis is put, as in the discussion over the CFSP and ESDP, on the 
prevention of conflicts and the prevention and management of crises. This emphasis 
also stresses the role of gathering, analysing and passing on to decision-makers 
adequate and timely information, also intelligence information, in the established 
mechanisms3.  
  
As information usually comes from various branches of intelligence, to standardise 
evaluations and information, which are passed on to the European elite, is an 
indispensable condition to form a European defence identity and a foreign policy. 
Furthermore, one should free oneself from the dependence on American intelligence 
                                                                          
1Bjorn Muller-Wille, “For our eyes only? Shaping an intelligence community within the EU”; EU Institute 
for Security Studies, 2004, p. 13. 
2 European  Security Strategy,  December 12th,  2003. 
3 Hans-Georg Ehrhart – ‘What model for CFSP?’ Chaillot Paper nr 55, Institute for Security Studies, 
EU, Paris, Oct 2002, pp. 28-39 
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technology and should create one’s own, namely a European telecommunication and 
satellite intelligence structure. It was only in the aftermath of the real terrorist threat 
and the problem with exchanging information on the topic of concern that an idea to 
formalise the intelligence co-operation and to create the next European agency has 
arouse.  
It is also necessary to mention that the lack of intelligence co-operation on national 
levels causes obstacles in the closer integration of intelligence actions, security 
services and police forces on the EU’s level.  There is no common European pattern 
to organise and co-ordinate security services and intelligence. Not only do these 
services have different rights and tasks but also various formal statuses. Some of 
them form independent agencies and departments subordinated to ministry of home 
or foreign affairs, ministry of justice, defence ministry as civil or military secret 
services, information and operational services centralised or even decentralised as in 
the case with the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Germany). 
Formal and informal co-operation and the exchange of information among these 
services also vary as well as the co-ordination of their tasks by superior authorities. 
Moreover, prior to the terrorist attack on New York there had been a tendency in the 
EU to limit the scope of information gathered and stored by national services. This as 
well as the access and the interference in police and administrative databases, such 
as, for example, the Schengen Information System, by secret services was to be 
restricted. These tendencies were influenced by organisations protecting civil 
liberties. Although, in the EU this approach has changed after September 11th, 2001, 
these issues still stir controversy among defenders of civil liberties, such as, for 
instance, Statewatch activists4.  A problem arouses, namely that of a possibility to 
avoid by those services certain national restrictions on gathering a variety of data and 
transmitting them to European databases. Without standardising these issues, it will 
be difficult to talk about a full co-ordination of services, which have different formal 
powers on the EU’s level. On the other hand, it should be underlined that in the 
aftermath of September 11th, 2001, the majority of states have undertaken clear 
                                                                          
 4 Reservations raised by defenders of civil liberties refer to a doubtful legal basis allowing secret 
services to access databases of SIS; on the basis of Art. 99.3 of the Schengen Convention, a 
possibility to observe persons and vehicles (pointed by adequate authorities) by secret services is, 
according to the Statewatch, a motion to allow secret services to access complete SIS resources; in: 
Statewatch News online: ‘SIS II takes ominous shape – SIS set to become the UE’s „Big Brother” 
database” – www.statewatch.org/nwes/2002/apr/01sis.htm. 
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efforts to broaden powers of their secret services and to better co-ordinate their 
actions5.  
  
Co-operation without publicity 
 
It would be hard to expect that the European integration in the second pillar was to 
begin with intelligence services, their secret mechanisms and products, as these are 
the most guarded services and are the highest attribute of state’s sovereignty.  For 
instance, it would be hard to expect that prior to the creation of a post of an EU 
foreign affairs minister, foresighted in the European Constitution, a European 
intelligence agency will be called into being. Yet another argument, apart from a 
logical one, is that such a caution is a result of the experience that has shown the 
effectiveness of the informal co-operation. This in turn has allowed maintaining full 
sovereignty, or at least a sense of it, in formal and legal respects. Since the 1970s 
European secret services have co-operated in the following working groups: in the 
TREVI group, Kilowatt group and so-called ‘Club of Bern’, in the framework of NATO, 
in the framework of bilateral relations among those agencies as well as with the US 
services and finally within the confines of the developing communitarian 
mechanisms. This co-operation encompassed both security services and lesser-
disclosed intelligence services. One can question whether this ‘Club of Bern’ method 
of co-operation is   more effective taking into consideration a common criticism of the 
co-operation of European secret services in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings. 
However, this method was also implemented in the framework of the European 
Council’s Counter-Terrorism Working Group (TWG)6 and is clearly supported by the 
new Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gijs de Vries and Secretary-General Javier 
Solana, as they proposed to create a consecutive terrorism working group 
encompassing only members of security services from the EU Member States7.  
                                                                          
5 ‘Secret services’ new rights in the fight against terrorism’, the analysis of the Internal Security 
Agency, abw.gov.pl/Terroryzm/Uzupełnienia/wy_bip.htm  
6 Council of the EU, Counter-Terrorism Coordinator – ‘Provisional findings of the two ‘peer evaluation’ 
mechanisms affecting the Union’s fight against terrorism”, 26/05/2004, p. 7.; Council of the EU, 
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator – ‘Working structures of the Council in terrorism matters – Options 
paper’, 25/05/2004, p. 2. 
7 Javier Solana – Summary of remarks, JHA Council 8 June 2004, SO159/04; Council of the EU, 
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator – ‘Working structures of the Council in terrorism matters – Opinions 
Paper’, 25.05.2004, p. 5 
8 JHA Council conclusions, 20.09.2001. 
 4
Center for International Relations© 
 
 
Beginnings of the EU 
 
It is also not true that the European Union itself does not currently possess 
mechanisms of the exchange of intelligence information; to say plainly the beginnings 
of such an agency. First of all, not only classical information of political, economic or 
military intelligence but also, especially in the anti-terrorism and anti-criminal context, 
information of so-called criminal intelligence and, moreover, issues belonging to the 
third pillar i.e. Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) are rated as intelligence information by 
the majority of analysts. Such flow of information gathered on a national level by 
police forces reaches or should reach Europol or databases of the Schengen 
Information System (SIS). It seems that in this field the situation is relatively the best 
taking all sorts of intelligence co-operation into account. It is also due to the fact that 
a political factor in this field of criminal co-operation is non-significant.   
In the framework of JHA, there is yet another form of co-operation of this sort of 
services. In the aftermath of September 11th attacks, secret services in particular 
security and national intelligence, were integrated into the EU counter-terrorism 
mechanisms8. In the EU Member States these services are often connected in one 
way or another with police forces. After September 11th, 2001, co-ordinating 
authorities or bodies which link flows of intelligence and police information were 
created almost everywhere9.    
As far as ‘traditional’ intelligence is concerned the situation is better than it appears to 
be, according to alarming media reports in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings. 
Better does not, however, mean good. The already existing and developing EU 
paraintelligence structures, such as, for example, the Intelligence Division of the EU 
military staff and the EU’s Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), are in the initial stage10. 
So are similar mechanisms in the field of CFSP and ESDP. According to the 
conclusions of the EU summit on 25 March 2004, it was announced that a role played 
                                                                          
9 British NSIS, a prototype of the Polish National Centre of Criminal Information (KCIK), is playing at 
the moment a role of the interface between police and security services, MI5 Peter Chalk, William 
Rosenau – ‘Confronting the “Enemy Within” – Security Intelligence, the Police and Counter-terrorism 
in Four Democracies’, RAND Corporation 2003, p. 12 
 
10 Ulrich Schnerckener – ‘EU Crisis Management in Macedonia’. 
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by the SITCEN would be broadened in the field of the assessments of threats11.  Also 
Javier Solana and Gijs de Viers proposed to extend the SITCEN by representatives 
of secret services of the EU Member States. Such an organisation in turn would be 
capable of creating complete analyses and assessments of threats to internal and 
external security of the EU, in particular in the field of terrorism12. 
 
For and against ‘the European Union’s CIA’ 
 
The various forms of co-operation so far, also these within the European Union, have 
been based on the major secret services. Owing to this fact, it is not surprising that 
small states, deprived of their own effective intelligence services, which would be 
capable of recognising and neutralising terrorist threats, are insisting on the creation 
of European intelligence. Those small countries are also not satisfied with the present 
co-operation with the states that have such services. 
The countries with effective intelligence services, such as the so-called “Big Five”  
(Italy, Great Britain, Germany, France and Spain) which together with the 
Netherlands and Sweden participate in the SITCEN, are against revolutionary 
changes in the present system of the intelligence co-operation in the EU. The 
appointment of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator has perhaps not been a 
breakthrough in the European co-operation against terrorism owing to the unsolved 
matters in the co-operation between police services placed in the third pillar (JHA) 
and intelligence co-operating within the framework of CFSP (the second pillar) and 
units of Secretariat General, described below, and the EU military staff. However, the 
appointment of such a person responsible for counter-terrorism issues can help to 
create certain mechanisms; a common intelligence policy of Members States is the 
case in point.  
 
 
                                                                          
11 The European Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 25.03.2004, Annex I, Objective 7. 
According to Bjorn Muller-Wille the thing is to create the Counter-Terrorist Department in the 
framework of the SITCEN that would double the staff – Bjorn Muller-Wille – ‘Building a European 
intelligence community in response to terrorism’ – European Security Review, p. 13 
12 Brussels’ European Council 17-18.06.2004 – ‘Presidency Conclusions’, p. 3; Javier Solana – 
Summary of remarks, JHA Council 08.06.2004, SO159/04; Council of the EU, Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator – Working structures of the Council in terrorism matters – Options paper’, 25.05.2005 p.4 
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Good, old ideas?   
 
In the situation of general obstruction of the most important European governments 
or their national intelligence agencies towards the creation of EU’s intelligence 
agency, it is worth going back to certain ideas from before March 11, 2004.  
 
Individual European countries are not capable, for practical, i.e. logistical and 
financial, reasons, of having comprehensive intelligence which would be built on the 
model of intelligence of the world’s superpowers, and which would allow them to 
react better to threats of the present, globalised world, from terrorism do economic 
crises13. Since this is the case, a logical solution would be to create a European 
Common Intelligence Policy (ECIP) as a ‘technical’ background for Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP)14.  To ‘Europeanise’ national intelligence should remain a 
necessary condition to fulfil this goal. This would resemble the process of 
“Europeanising’ foreign policies of Member States, described by literature15.  It can 
be stated by analogy that the process of “Europeanising’ intelligence is the process 
of foreign policy change at the national level originated by the adaptation pressures 
and the new opportunities and challenges generated by the European integration 
process.  Terrorism is just such a challenge and threat, which can, in the foreseeable 
future, afflict Member States for the very reason of just being a member state rather 
than for its national politics.  
Yet another condition is to transform the currently existing structures, in particular the 
EU’s Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) in the General Secretariat, into a centre co-
ordinating the exchange of intelligence and, in this sense, work of security services of 
Europe of 25, not of the seven Member States of the EU as it was the case until now. 
This alteration would be extremely important in the context of a general threat for 
CFSP and ESDP of creating a sort of European directorate. This is applicable in case 
                                                                          
13 Alessandro Politi –  ‘Why is a European intelligence necessary?’ – Chaillot Papers34, ISS of WEU, 
1998, p. 3. 
14  WUE Defence Committee Report from 1996 (‘European Intelligence Policy’, Doc. 1517, WEU 
Assembly, Paris 13.05.1996. 
15  Jordi Vaquer and Fanes defines after  J.I. Torreblanci, ‘Europeanising’ of foreign policy ‘as the 
process of foreign policy change at the national level originated by the adaptation pressures and the 
new opportunities generated by the European integration process’ – Jordi Vaquer and Fanes – ‘ The 
candidate countries’ foreign policies on the eve of enlargement’, in; ‘Beyond enlargement: The new 
members and the new frontiers of the enlarged EU’, Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus, 2002, p. 
56. 
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of both traditional foreign policy of so-called “Big Three”16 (i.e. France, Germany and 
Great Britain) as well as of intelligence co-operation of so-called “Big Five”  (Italy, 
Great Britain, Germany, France and Spain). In this context, one should assume a 
negative outcome of the Madrid meeting of this group on 22 March 2004 devoted to 
the co-ordination of intelligence actions, where intelligence services of smaller states 
and candidates countries, in particular that of Poland, were excluded despite various 
protests. This was rather an act of deliberate conspicuousness of the “Big Five” in 
response to a proposal to tighten and disseminate European intelligence exchange 
as well as to create a European Intelligence Agency17. Again, as in the case with 
CFSP, a European Common Intelligence Agency would provide, especially smaller 
countries, with an opportunity to protect better their national interests, for example in 
the wake of a terrorist threat.  This regularity is confirmed by the fact that such small 
countries as Belgium, Austria and Greece are especially in favour of creating a 
European Intelligence Agency18.  
The next step in the process of ‘Europeanising’ intelligence and in creating a 
European Common Intelligence Policy would be to distribute tasks according to 
operational and information capacities of a given national service.  For instance, 
French intelligence has been traditionally interested in Africa, Spain in South 
America19, while new Member States are to some extend experienced with both the 
former USSR countries as well as the Balkans and the Middle East. Finally, it would 
also be possible to make a wider use by the Union’s analytical and intelligence units   
of the following: information and non-governmental analyses as well as research 
centres, private, scientific and related to economics, which relay upon Open Source 
Intelligence (OSINT)20.  
 
 
 
                                                                          
16 Dr. Simon Duke – ‘The Enlarged EU and the CFSP’, CSM, Warsaw 2004, p.5 
17 ‘Spain’s Disclosure a Leap in Intelligence Sharing” – Stratfor, 23.03.2004. 
18 Dr. John M. Nomikos presents in details the Greek standpoint in this matter, e.g. in ‘European Union 
Intelligence Policy: A Greek Perspective’, Research Institute for European and American Studies, 
Athens 2004. 
19 ‘The new challenges facing European intelligence – reply to the annual report of the Council’ –
Assembly of Western European Union. The Interim European Security and Defence Assembly. Report 
of the Defence Committee, 04.06.2002, Document A/1775, p.11. 
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Dilemmas concerning the three pillars 
 
Islamic terrorism has imposed a threat which forms the basis for a discussion over 
the intelligence co-operation and co-ordination. This context also forces to question 
the traditional division into an internal and external security as well as the division into 
security and intelligence services. This is especially relevant in the EU, which is 
characterised by the pillar division and policies, and where there are obstacles in the 
co-operation among individual areas.     
Not only does this concern the European security policy itself but also its instruments, 
including information. A ‘new security dilemma’ implies a complete change in 
traditional sources of threats and actors as well as methods of creating a security 
policy in the age of globalisation. For the sake of solving this dilemma, the traditional 
way of perceiving the security and defence policy, with its clear definitions of 
interests, threats and execution instruments, is useless21.  
Similarly, the way of organising the European security structures in the way that it is 
relevant to traditional threats of the 20th century and the Cold War is an anachronism 
in the fight against cross-boarder terrorism of Al-Kaida. Since a terrorist threat can 
come both from external as well as internal sources in a given country or the 
European Union on the whole, it is suggested that the fight against terrorism should 
be conducted according to the nature of a real danger rather than to the traditional 
territorial and national indicators22. 
  
Poland 
 
As far as Poland is concerned, it is justified to question a formal and practical level of 
preparation of our security services for the European integration in the field of 
collecting, processing and transferring intelligence information. Unfortunately, the 
answer is negative due to partially understandable reasons: general caution 
concerning Atlantic and pro-American Polish national security policy in the face of 
any initiatives that could even potentially violate the Polish independence. Every 
                                                                          
21 Hans-Georg Ehrhart – ‘What model for CFSP?’ Chaillot Paper nr 55, Institute for Security Studies, 
EU, Paris, Oct 2002, pp. 14-18 
22  in: Daniel Keohane, Adam Townsend – ‘A Joined-up EU Security Policy’ – CER Bulletin, Issue 33, 
Centre for European Reform, December 2003.   
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proposal supported by France in the field of security was traditionally perceived as 
being anti-American or anti-NATO. Consequently, ESDP and even CFSP were 
unfortunately treated in a similar manner in Poland23. Hence, the caution towards 
ESDP24. As a result, in Poland less importance was attached perhaps towards the 
intelligence co-operation within the EU and the WEU as well as NATO, the more so 
because Poland used not to be a rightful member of the two first organisations. What 
is more, in the period and scope of the accession negotiations CFSP did not play a 
significant role and this chapter was usually being closed as one of the first chapters 
in the negotiations25. What was also noticed by foreign observers was the claim laid 
by Poland to be treated as a big country26, not to mention the declared in 2003 
ambitions to become a quasi superpower. Consequently, Poland was to a smaller 
degree interested in making the foreign policy increasingly more common. In my 
opinion, this has been a false diagnosis and Poland as a country relatively weak to 
impose pressure on the international arena, although geographically ‘big’, should 
rather be interested in developing CFSP, ESDP as well as in developing similar 
processes in the field of intelligence co-operation.  
On the other hand, it is questionable whether, regarding the above mentioned 
‘special relations’ with the USA, Poland is the most welcomed partner for information 
exchange and the European integration, especially for such intelligence services as 
French or German. Additionally, in case of the new Member States, the EU can face 
a problem with credibility and ‘tightness’ of their secret services, in particular in the 
context of the threat of infiltration by the former KGB allies.   
 
Regardless of general political, strategic or even psychological conditions, what is of 
great significance is the capacity of Polish services to co-operate or integrate. In 
                                                                          
23 A broader view in: Olaf Osica – ‘European Common Security and and Defence Policy from the 
Polish perspective’ -  CSM 2001. 
24 Jordi Vaquer and Fanes – in ‘The candidate countries’ foreign policies on the eve of enlargement’, 
in; „Beyond enlargement: The new members and the new frontiers of the enlarged EU’, Institut 
Universitari d’Estudis Europeus, 2002, p. 68. 
25 Dr. Simon Duke – ‘The Enlarged EU and the CFSP’, CSM, Warsaw, 2004, p. 2. 
26 Jordi Vaquer and Fanes – in ‘The candidate countries’ foreign policies on the eve of enlargement’, 
in; ‘Beyond enlargement: The new members and the new frontiers of the enlarged EU’, Institut 
Universitari d’Estudis Europeus, 2002, p. 55, notices that: ‘The candidates for the next enlargement of 
the EU are mostly small countries. Poland alone resists such a definition, and even Poland, once it 
becomes a member of the EU, is likely to be a “second-rank” state’. 
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2002 the division of the Office of State Protection (UOP) into two agencies – 
intelligence and national security – would have had a minor significance if effective 
mechanisms of co-ordination and the exchange of information with other services 
(financial, police and military ones) had been created. What is worse is the fact that 
there are no clear divisions of competences of individual units while management in 
this field is extremely unclear and vague. Also clear-cut structures responsible for co-
ordination are not defined27. This is especially visible with regard to such a threat as 
terrorism, which exists beyond boarders and requires the co-operation of various 
agencies. Until now in the early stages of the development of European intelligence, 
the above-mentioned situation is not threatening. While some states face similar 
problems, still others, which own national intelligence co-ordinating structures, are 
quite cautious towards the process of integration within the framework of the EU. 
 
At any point in time this situation can, however, change and it would be worth to have 
Poland prepared for such integration, so that the level of participation in this process 
by Polish services would be the result of a political decision, not the one imposed by 
structural or technical limitations.  
 
July 20, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
27 Council of Ministers, Regulation nr 79 from 12 September 2003 does not define rules, scope and 
the course of the co-operation and detailed division of powers among the Internal Security Agency 
(ABW), the Foreign Intelligence Agency and the Military Information Services. 
  
 11
Center for International Relations© 
 
 12
Center for International Relations 
 
 
WHO WE ARE? 
 
The Center for International Relations (CIR) is an independent, non-governmental 
establishment dedicated to the study of Polish foreign policy as well as those international 
political issues, which are of crucial importance to Poland. The Center’s primary objective is 
to offer political counselling, to describe Poland’s current international situation, and to 
continuously monitor the government’s foreign policy moves. The CIR prepares reports and 
analyses, holds conferences and seminars, publishes books and articles, carries out 
research projects and supports working groups. Over the last few years, we have succeeded 
in attracting a number of experts, who today cooperate with the CIR on a regular basis. Also, 
we have built up a forum for foreign policy debate for politicians, MPs, civil servants, local 
government officials, journalists, academics, students and representatives of other NGOs. 
The CIR is strongly convinced that, given the foreign policy challenges Poland is facing 
today, it ought to support public debates on international issues in Poland.  
 
The founder and president of the Center for International Relations is Mr Janusz Reiter. 
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